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Has the European Parliament (EP)’s acquisition of legislative powers diluted its 
traditional support for diffuse interests? This article considers the various arguments 
that challenge the EP’s reputation as a champion of diffuse interests and advances an 
alternative interpretation grounded in the idea of the EP as a legitimacy seeking 
institution. These arguments are explored in light of EP strategies of public 
engagement. Whilst previous analyses have been centred on the EP itself, we broaden 
the empirical focus to examine patterns of diffuse interest engagement with the EP. 
We find variance in the way diffuse advocates engage with the EP, and identify a 
driver of differentiation among NGO advocates of diffuse interests organized at EU 
level. We draw on interviews with NGOs, representatives from EU political 
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The European Parliament (EP) was traditionally seen as a source of support for 
ambitious regulatory demands, making it a seemingly favourable venue for ‘diffuse 
interests’ (Judge, 1992; Pollack, 1997; Kohler-Koch 1998; Watson and Shackleton, 
2003). This perception has changed in recent years, as scholarly accounts have 
highlighted some problematic effects of the EP’s growing legislative power. In an era 
where the EP lacked competencies it had been easy for it to support a range of popular 
causes, but its changing role has given rise to mixed accounts of the way it works with 
diffuse interests (Smith, 2008; Burns and Carter, 2010; Burns et al, 2013; Kurzer and 
Cooper, 2012; Rasmussen, 2012; Rasmussen, 2014). We examine whether and how 
the EP’s acquisition of legislative powers has diluted its traditional support for diffuse 
interests. First, we synthesize recent arguments put forward in the literature under a 
broader political opportunity perspective. While rooted in different literatures, these 
arguments help us understand different pieces of the broader puzzle of the EP’s role in 
championing diffuse interests. They draw our attention to key dimensions of the 
external environment of diffuse and organized advocates, which impact upon their 
involvement in the EU policy-making process. Second, we develop an alternative 
interpretation of the EP as a ‘demoi-cratic’ legitimacy seeking institution (Cheneval et 
al, 2015); while political opportunity arguments tend to view the EP as a utility- 
seeking institution, this interpretation emphasizes the normative bases of EP 
behaviour. A key insight underpinning this view is that, acting upon accepted 
standards of democratic representation, the EP will strive to seek institutional 
autonomy, among other things through the development of in-house knowledge, in 
order to continue to champion diffuse interests.  It therefore provides a useful frame 





with which to revisit some of the claims about changes in the way in which the EP 
engages with diffuse interests. 
Third, whereas most of the extant literature is EP-centred, we include an 
analysis of NGOs as organized advocates for diffuse interests, which an established 
literature in transnational decision making systems identify as systemic proxies for 
civil society interests (Steffek, 2013; Joachim & Locher, 2009). Our analysis 
recognizes the distinction between: the EP adopting a mantle as entrepreneurial 
representative of diffuse interests which it perceives and defines; diffuse citizen 
mobilisation focused on the EP and facilitated largely by online means (Gehlen, 2006; 
Dür and Mateo, 2014); and NGOs acting as organized advocates of diffuse interests in 
a political system with limited popular engagement (Greenwood, 2017).  Where 
issues are of high saliency, NGOs seek to enhance their reputation through aligning 
positions with their interpretation of public sentiment (Junk, 2015) Where they are 
successful in elevating issues to public salience, so the European Parliament tends to 
follow (Duer and Mateo, 2014; Rasmussen, 2014).. 
 
 
Power at the expense of diffuse interests—what are the claims? 
 
The recent literature provides a number of reasons to suppose that the EP’s 
‘champion’ role might have become diluted over time as a result of the legislative 
empowerment of the EP. In this section, we discuss the potential effects of the 
legislative empowerment of the EP for diffuse interests, using the concept of political 
opportunity structure. Developed in studies of the formation and consolidation of the 
nation-state (Tarrow, 1992) it has been used to capture changes in mobilization 
dynamics linked to the political process of European integration (Marks and McAdam 
1996; Imig & Tarrow, 2001). We distinguish four potential sources of increasing 





tensions between the EP and diffuse interests: (1) formal-institutional constraints 
relating to committee assignments under co-decision; (2) informal-institutional 
constraints relating to the embrace of informal trilogues in the practice of co-decision; 
(3) cultural-normative, relating to the evolution of EP preferences and self- 
understanding as a result of its legislative empowerment; and finally (4) material- 




Growing NGO-adverse committee assignment bias 
 
A first argument centred on institutional rules of the game highlights changes in the 
system of legislative referral in the EP. There have been claims that the introduction 
of the ‘Hughes procedure’ in the EP (2002)—involving the way in which legislative 
files are assigned to standing committees and relationships prescribed between them 
in cases of shared competence—constrained the role of committees with a record of 
championing diffuse interests (Smith 2008). 
 
 
Growth of NGO-adverse informal trilogues 
 
A second potential constraint for diffuse interests is the shift to early agreements 
concluded through informal inter-institutional negotiations (‘trilogues’), and the 
distributional consequences this mechanism may carry for civil society interests. 
Trilogues are an informal institution bringing together the representatives of the EP, 
Council, and Commission in a secluded setting to conclude legislative agreements. 
Trilogues were not foreseen in the Treaties, which did not spell out the institutional 
mechanisms for resolving conflicts between the EP and Council under co-decision. 
They have nevertheless developed rapidly in the last decade (European Parliament 





2014a), to the extent that the General Court of the EU now recognises them as a 
regular part of the legislative process. Trilogues may hurt NGOs, and by extension 
diffuse interests, in several ways. First, trilogues are often characterized as ‘black 
boxes’ making the EU policy process opaque (EurActiv, 2015, 2017; House of Lords, 
2016) and unaccountable. Second, trilogues are also perceived as favouring those 
interests with superior resources, capable of developing access and monitoring the 
course of negotiations (Bunyan, 2007; International New York Times, 2014). Finally, 
in one interpretation, trilogues have been cast as disproportionately disadvantaging 
smaller parties in the EP because they get allocated fewer legislative files under the 
EP’s points based system, thus diminishing the ability of left-leaning parties, in 
particular, to champion the cause of kindred diffuse interests is seen as notably 
diminished (Burns et al, 2013). 
 
 
Emergence of NGO-adverse legislative norms 
 
Two additional arguments are often advanced to link the shift to co-decision to a 
gradual rapprochement between the EP and business interests. First, there is an 
expectation that legislative empowerment has a moderating effect on the EP’s 
preferences. When the EP has the power to enforce its position, it becomes more 
attentive to the political implications of its preferences and more sensitive to the 
political realities at hand. This is also a feature of studies contrasting generally strong 
public protection positions in a given policy field before the advent of co-decision 
with much more diluted positions taken afterwards (Burns & Carter, 2010; Ripoll 
Servent and Mackenzie, 2011), and undertaken across a range of EP committees. 
These studies incorporate expectations of variance across EP committees according to 
the degree of familiarisation with co-decision powers, although Burns and Carter’s 





analysis of positions adopted by one EP Committee up to the end of EP6 (2004-9), i.e. 
before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, remains the only quantitative 
assessment to date. In a later section, we summarise insights from interviews drawing 
on the vast majority of EP committees. 
 
 
Increasing EP resource-dependency 
 
The other expectation is that legislative empowerment makes the EP more dependent 
on business interests and organizations for the provision of crucial policy 
information. This is because the information needs of a parliament with full 
legislative powers require that it expand its range of expert sources beyond advocates 
(Judge & Earnshaw, 2011; Busby, 2012; Marshall, 2012); in turn, this is expected to 
give business interests greater political clout in the EP (Burson Marsteller, 2009; 
Coen, 2009; Dür and de Bièvre, 2007). Nonetheless, these latter expectations do not 
assimilate the distributional effects of regulatory proposals in which competitive 
interest group politics arise where costs and benefits divide the interests of capital, 
and from which political institutions can use to increase their autonomy. 
Bouwen’s classic study of business lobbying in the European Parliament in the 
period 2000-2001 was premised on a supposition that the driver of MEPs relationship 
with interest organisations at that time would be political knowledge 
(‘encompassingness’) rather than expert technical knowledge (Bouwen, 2004, see also 
Bouwen and Mccown, 2007)). As the EP’s powers increased, so the expectation was 
generated that there would be a qualitative shift in the type of information which 
legislators would require. Here, advocates (‘we want..’) might be juxtaposed with 
professionalized interest organisations supplying sufficient information (‘we want 
because..’) to satisfy the needs of legislators. More recently, the focus has turned 





towards members of the EP secretariat and indirect lobbying by entrenched interests 
(including both Commission officials as well as by lobby organisations): 
Using a mixture of deductive analysis together with survey data collected in 
the period 2007-2010, Marshall showed how committee secretariats developed their 
expertise proactively, but stealthily, ‘filter[ing] and repackage[ing]’ information 
gathered from their engagement with policy experts from the European Commission 
and from stakeholder interests as ‘independent expert advice’ (Marshall 2012: 1385). 
Sources of policy advice for MEPs forms part of any picture involving the 






While these claims have now become established as the new conventional wisdom on 
the EP-NGO interactions, we argue that they underestimate the role of shared 
community norms in orienting EP actions with its environment. We propose here an 
alternative perspective, which emphasizes how the search for legitimacy has driven 
the EP to develop economic and social knowledge; and how, in turn, knowledge- 
building serves diffuse interests. 
 
 
The EP as a legitimacy-seeking institution 
 
Institution-building does not take place in a social vacuum: the emerging institutional 
nucleus must reckon with established forces in the surrounding community.2 This is a 
difficult situation as classic institutionalists foresaw. The would-be institution may not 
reflect the balance of power in the surrounding community; it lacks ‘historical’ 
 
 
2 This section partly draws on Roederer-Rynning (2018). 





legitimacy, and it may simply be ‘unable to mobilize the community for action’ 
(Selznick 1949, 260). From this perspective, the EP may be conceptualized as a 
‘formal authority’ with legitimacy-seeking imperatives stemming from the political 
hegemony (both material and cultural) of member states and their institutions in the 
Euro-polity (Sbragia 1990). While claiming to be a parliament like any other, the EP 
must find its place in a democratic polity of a new kind: a ‘demoi-cracy’ that is young, 
weakly centred and culturally as well as linguistically plural (Nicolaidis 2004 ; 
Cheneval et al 2015 ). A key feature of EU democracy is that it is ‘evolving on the 
basis of mainly nationally constituted demoi’ (Cheneval et al. 2015, p.2) or 
‘community of others’ (Weiler 1999, Nicolaïdis 2004, cited in Cheneval et al. 2015, 
p.2). This means that EP assertion, more than is the case in any other parliament or 
perhaps even in any other policy-making authority in the EU, must either rely on 
informal power-sharing mechanisms to coopt member states or, in Selznick’s words, 
mobilize the community for action. 
Understanding the profound and continuing cultural relevance of the demoi is 
key, because it has two main implications. The first is that the EP will seek to 
compensate for the weakness of its electoral linkage to European societies by 
cultivating close ties to advocates of diffuse interests. The EP’s long-standing need 
for institutional assertion, linked to the limited basis of its popular mandate (43% 
turnout in each of the past two elections), has long been considered to make it a 
hospitable location for diffuse interests. Pollack observed that ‘ as the Community’s 
only directly elected political organization,’ the EP ‘has acted not only as a 
competence-maximiser like the Commission, but also as a champion of the 
environment, consumers, women, and other diffuse but electorally popular causes.’ 
(Pollack, 1997: 580-1). The elective affinities between diffuse interests and EP 





assertion have a lasting character since they are bound up with the legitimacy of this 
institution. 
The second implications is that a basic imperative for the EP is to develop 
institutional autonomy in order to sustain long-standing ties to civil society 
organizations. Institutional autonomy may be understood as the capacity of the EP to 
‘formulate independent goals and development strategies’ (Skocpol 1985). Given the 
technical complexity of EU policy-making, a key component of EP autonomy is the 
development of reliable and high-quality in-house knowledge. The point, however, is 
about institution-building, not just policy-making imperatives.  In other words, it is 
not simply that knowledge is indispensable for the EP to perform its policy-making 
functions, but more importantly, that ‘the institutionalization of public processes from 
promoting and applying economic knowledge is…connected to [institution] building’ 
(Furner and Supple 1990, 31). 
In the following section, we substantiate this alternative view of the EP as a 
demoi-cratic, legitimacy-seeking institution by providing summary evidence of 





We illustrate the above arguments with reference to case studies. Developing a 
regulatory response to the financial crisis presented a notable opportunity in EP7 for 
the European Parliament to showcase its role as a guardian of diffuse interests. Thus, 
the Economic and Monetary Affairs committee of the EP (ECON) used the 
opportunity to successfully achieve its goals of a cap on bankers’ bonuses in the 2013 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), sacrificing where necessary its positions in 
associated files on issues of lower saliency (House of Commons, 2017).  Whilst the 





degree of saliency offers one established means to read the acts of legislatures, it can 
be extended to capture wider processes of norm diffusion in which the supply of 
information plays a key role. An example of the latter involves the Green member of 
the EP’s negotiating team helping to sustainably fill gaps in information supply as a 
means to regulate banks through the establishment of Finance Watch by Green MEPs 
in 2011. Since its establishment this NGO has developed a staff complement of 13, 
funded by grants from the European Commission (50%), and foundations and other 
sources (Finance Watch, 2017). It continues to need a variety of technical information 
and political intelligence, the satisfaction of which requires interaction with a wide 
variety of sources. The legislative team from ECON driving the file met with a wide 
variety of stakeholders, with MEP assistants covering the field and using the 
information they acquired in order to enhance their ability to establish independent 
positions (Greenwood & Roederer-Rynning, 2014)). In current regulatory files 
following a similar pattern on issues of high saliency involving concentration of costs 
and diffusion of benefits, legislative teams have demonstrated a similar adeptness. 
Thus, in order to establish caps on mobile phone roaming charges, the assistant to the 
Rapporteur on one of the lead policy committees played a key role in selecting 25 
stakeholder organisations to meet with from among a total of 60 requests, using as 
their criteria which organisations seemed to be in a position to provide information to 
help develop the regulatory position (Moreton-Burt, 2015). 
The EP’s increasing informational requirements are a powerful driver of 
recent internal reforms, principally involving the establishment of the Economic 
Governance Support Unit in 2012, and the European Parliament Research Service 
(EPRS) in 2013. 40 staff currently work in EPRS (EPRS, 2016), in a library, a 
Members’ Research Services Directorate, and an Impact Assessment Directorate, 





whose internal services are supplemented with outsourced commissioning, and which 
anticipates the need for such assessments to accompany EP amendments introduced 
relatively late into the legislative process. Whilst committees continue to receive 
regular technical briefings from the European Commission, members are now well 
equipped to form their own independent assessments. The EP’s capacities to 
Committee Secretariats have experienced significant growth, with staff of the 
Directorate General for Internal Policies (DGIpol), responsible for servicing most of 
the key co-decision committees, increasing by 12% between 2011 and 2012 
(European Parliament, 2014c). Secretariat sizes of 20-30 for the 22 Standing 
Committees of the EP are now commonplace.  Each member now receives funding 
for four assistants. Few national parliaments, with the clear exception of US 
Congress, enjoy access to knowledge and expertise on the scale enjoyed by the 
European Parliament. 
A less visible source of information for MEPs are the policy advisors from the 
political groups of the European Parliament. There is no available scholarly analysis 
of these actors, but little doubt as to their central information role, as highlighted by 
Busby in an ethnographic write up of her seven month internship in the EP: 
 
 
“Once an MEP becomes a rapporteur or shadow and becomes involved in the 
detailed work of a report, the first people they are likely to contact are the group 
co-ordinator, relevant group Policy Advisor, and committee secretariat Advisors” 
(Busby, 2013, p.104). 
 
 
Political groups have allocations of policy advisors according to a formula centred 
on the number of MEPs attached to the group, ranging from three officials for a 





‘busy’ committee for each of the larger groups through to one advisor per three 
committees for the smallest (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011). Many are of 
sufficient longevity in post to enable them to develop substantial expertise, and, as 
described in the next section, have corresponding links with NGOs which share their 
outlook. MEPs assistants also often act as a direct point of contact between the 
member and lobby groups, fielding a substantial number of emails per day, and often 
meeting with such groups as a substitute for an otherwise busy member (Busby, 2013; 
Busby and Belkacem, 2013). These regular and routinized contacts enable them to 
acquire policy specific as well as political information from a diverse number of 
sources. Assistants may not be able to master the detail of every legislative clause in 
files which may extend to hundreds of pages, but work to the main policy goals of 
their MEPs, and sufficient to ensure that MEPs can steer the political course they seek 
from a file. Whilst assistants have a higher turnover than political group staff because 
they are at an earlier career stage, a familiar pathway is a subsequent move into 
positions with organisations involved in advocacy to political institutions. These 
young actors often come straight from higher education, often with activist 
experiences well suited to careers in politics. The café lined Place Lux, situated in 
front of the EP, on Thursday after work is an essential network venue where early 
career stagers in the ‘Brussels bubble’, where friendships from student days are 
refreshed in the new context of professional interactions, and introductions flourish. 
These networks form part of the knowledge circulation exchanges in which the EP is 
embedded, with little to suppose that information flows would become orientated 
towards producer interests as a result of new legislative powers in co-decision. 





Reconsidering the EP’s relationship with organized interests: Preliminary 
evidence from the NGOs 
Many claims regarding the declining status of NGOs with the EP reviewed earlier are 
centred on institutional changes within the EP itself. In this section we turn our 
attention to NGO themselves. We draw data from interviews with NGOs and social 
movements operating at EU level (14), bifurcated between those involved in cross- 
party intergroups (for reasons discussed below), and across eight of the major NGO 
‘families’ at EU level as well as those operating across EP committee areas involving 
co-decision. In the EP, we conducted semi-structured interviews with a variety of 
personnel drawn from 16 of 22 legislative committees involved with co-decision, the 
EP political groups (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015), and with senior staff 
from 11 NGOs with an EP liaison officer to the EP, or which acted as an NGO 
‘family’ head.  We take into account the comment of a reviewer that NGOs might 
tend to overestimate their influence in the EP and to downplay obstacles, but this is 
not our experience; if anything, we see a tendency to under-estimate one’s own 
influence and to over-estimate the influence of one’s opponent.  We supplemented 
this information with selected interviews in the Commission and Council (Roederer- 
Rynning & Greenwood, 2017)). Finally, we supplement these insights with EU 
Transparency Register data on organizations holding access passes to the European 
Parliament. We use these data to explore: 1) how NGOs perceive the EP as a 
continuing venue for influence; 2) to what extent they identify co-decision practices 
(especially the trilogues) as detrimental to their engagement of the EP; and 3) how 
they engage the EP. If the political opportunity view is correct, we should see 
significant changes in NGO patterns of EP engagement, reflecting some perceptions 
that the EP has become a less permeable venue for influence.  On the other hand, if 





the view of the EP as a demoi-cratic, legitimacy-seeking institution is correct, then we 
should see that NGOs continue to experience the EP as a receptive venue for 




NGO strategies of EP engagement 
 
A clear distinction can be drawn among NGOs as to the way they manage their 
relations with the European Parliament. One segment, typically concerned with 
demographic issues involving cross-party consensus such as age and disability, have 
institutionalized their relationship with the EP through a corresponding ‘intergroup’. 
Whilst intergroups have no formal role in EP decision making, they are established in 
conformity with a set of EP regulatory rules (mainly for purposes of transparency and 
limiting their total number), providing an opportunity for cross-party, cross- 
committee forums bringing together MEPs with common interests. Using this route, 
intergroups can provide a means of agenda-setting with EP committees, providing a 
highly attractive route into the EP for NGOs (interviews 1-4). Their number is 
restricted to 28. A less formal structure still involves the establishment of an interest 
group, which have no official EP status at all and there is no central record of them, 
but which perform similar functions to that of an intergroup. A lead NGO often 
provides a secretariat function for intergroups and interest groups to meet, to which 
the NGO assigns a post-holder to act as dedicated EP liaison officer. At the start of 
each EP term intergroups are established anew and NGOs campaign among MEPs 
and parties for their support, although some date back to the first EP term; one NGO 
saw them as providing ‘a privileged relationship with the European Parliament’ 
(interview 5).  In this latter case, the intergroup provided not only a means of agenda- 





setting but also a campaign platform, in which the intergroup organizes public events 
in the European Parliament, numbering six in the 2013 European Year of Citizens. 
The pattern of engagement shows how the EP values participatory norms, and 
ultimately seeks legitimacy from its interaction with NGOs. An NGO servicing 
another long-time intergroup emphasized how ‘the EP is our established best friend’ 
(interview 6). The 18 Intergroups and Interest Groups in which EU NGOs play a key 
role are listed in Table 1: 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In NGOs without a corresponding intergroup/interest group, relations with the 
European Parliament are ‘mainstreamed’ in the daily work of their policy 
secretariats. Recent contributions to the literature have shown how MEP ‘foes’ are 
increasingly lobbied, in addition to ‘friends’ and (if different) the Rapporteur 
(Marshall, 2010; 2014). In a further nuance on the ‘friends’ theme, a characterisation 
was offered to us during the course of interviews which suggested that NGOs which 
need to lobby MEPs may have one ‘touch base’ meeting with their natural supporters 
(e.g. environmental protection NGOs with Green MEPs), then spend much of their 
time lobbying MEPs from the next most likely constituency (e.g. green NGOs with 
MEPs from the Socialists & Democratsi) (interview 8). Beyond legislative files, 
NGOs we interviewed reported the maintenance of long-term relationships with the 
President of the EP, the Conference of Presidents of Political Groups, with individual 
Committee Chairs, and in some cases with political group co-ordinators. NGOs use 
these established relationships with MEPs to work on EP own-initiative reports (an 
example provided in interviews involved a report on long-term care; interviews 6 and 
7) and EP opinions (such as a report of the impact of the financial crisis on vulnerable 
groups; interview 9).  These examples have been particularly significant for a large 





number of NGOs in the established family of social policy NGOs (the Social 
Platform), and from there to the family of health policy NGOs, whose lead 
organisation (European Public Health Alliance) currently hosts the ‘family of 
families’ of NGOs, the Contact Group of Civil Society (interview 9). Our interviews 
with NGOs had also followed hard on the heels of inter-institutional negotiations over 
the EU Multi-Annual Budget Framework (2014-2020), where EU NGOs from 
education, culture, and social policy areas recounted tales of how they found cross- 
party support in the EP to restore budget lines removed by European Commission 
austerity inspired proposals to scale back EU spending (interviews 10, 11, 12). 
A surprisingly understated factor in the literature on the EP is the way in 
which its electoral cycle provides NGOs with opportunities for advocacy and 
campaigning. This may have been based on an assumption that all EU politics is 
elitist (see, for instance, Saurugger, 2008) and that links between federated EU NGOs 
and civil society are largely symbolic. The NGOs we interviewed were actively 
campaigning among election candidates to secure pledges on policy commitments, 
using their websites to list responses (or otherwise) from candidates. One NGO told 
us how the advisors from all the political groups had been consulted during the 
preparation of these pledges (interview 13). 
A political group advisor we interviewed (interview 14) had been active in 
social movements during the defeat by the EP of the proposal for a software patent 
Directive in 2005ii. This linkage between diffuse interests and political group 
advisors was highlighted in the comments of another NGO: 
 
 
“When we have prepared amendments it is essential for us to have contact with 
political advisors; MEPs follow instructions from party groups, so you should 





never underestimate the influence of the political advisor, who often has 
substantial expertise” (interview 15). 
Another NGO identified how both political advisors and assistants provided 
her best contacts (interview 16), while another e-NGO commented that “you need 
excellent relationships with the Assistants, and you have to add value there” 
(interview 17). These formal and informal exchanges strengthen the independent 
basis for EP policy action. 
Resources 
 
Whilst the EU Transparency Register carries some limitations of data quality, the 
information it provides about the main players lobbying at EU level has shown a 
steady improvement over time, partly due to the activist role of NGO watchdogs. 
Despite perceptions to the contrary, the differences in resources deployed for lobbying 
related activities between producer and diffuse interests are relatively narrow (citation 
4), largely due to an extensive system of funding for NGOs.  The ‘hotspot’ of 
premium property rental costs in Brussels is currently the district adjacent to the EP 
surrounding the Square de Meeûs (SdM) (Politico, 2015); a clutch of ‘NGO houses,’ 
based on a model of ethical funding streams providing property and shared back- 
office facilities, offer a large number of NGOs with the means to locate themselves 
alongside the best resourced business related advocatesiii. In terms of specific 
resources devoted to the EP, the Transparency Register provides data about pass- 
holders, which provides an indication of levels of professional engagement. Access to 
an EP pass provides a substantial incentive for organisations to sign up to the 
Transparency Register. The scheme provides twelve months accreditation for 
organisations to obtain a one-day pass to the EP on demand via a dedicated desk, with 
largely unrestricted roaming thereafter, and which provides substantial opportunities 





to network with EP staff and staff of MEPs as well as the members themselves. The 
currency of political consultancies is information, and thus it is unsurprising they 
should be the highest average pass-holders of all categories of interest on the 
Transparency Register (3.6 per organisation). But of significance is that the 360 
NGOs (category III of the register) with a pass to the EP premises hold an average of 
2.8 passes per organisation, compared to an average of 2.6 for the 850 producer 
organisations (mainly companies and business associations) in category II of the 
register (Table 2): 
 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 
Table 2 demonstrates broad equivalence between category II and III pass- 
holders across a number of variables, including the proportion of organisations 
holding a pass (whether an organisation is based inside Belgium or outside), as well 
as the number of passes held. Table 3 shows the distribution of pass-holders in 
category III of the register, while Table 4 identifies the organisations in category III 
with the highest number of passes, where the active positions of global NGOs with 
EU policy offices, as well as the European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC) is clear. 
 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
 
A relatively neglected issue in the literature on the EP committee system 
involves the largely unseen work of sub-committees, and which have been used a 





means of agenda-setting issues for a dense landscape of health related NGOs (Greer, 
2009) active at EU level. In our interviews, we also found evidence that health related 
NGOs were using this route, while there was a tendency in EP7 for committees 
working in core producer fields, such as ECON, to resist the use of sub- committees 
as a means of making their work more visible (interview 18). We did not encounter 
during the course of our interviews with either NGOs or with the ENVI secretariat 
any evidence that the changes to the EP Committee system introduced by the Hughes 
procedure had resulted in a dilution of the ability of ENVI to champion diffuse causes. 
The mechanism is a two-way street, with ENVI issuing twelve challenges of its own 
during the course of EP7 (European Parliament, 2014b). As one interviewee from an 
environmental NGO established at EU level explained: 
 
 
“the more committees you have working intensively on an issue – even as an 
opinion committee – so you will get more amendments generated, which the 
lead committee have to consider.  So the result is pluralism” (interview 19). 
 
In sum, neither Transparency Register access pass data nor our interviews provide 
evidence that the EP’s enhanced powers have come at a cost to NGOs. Rather, they 
demonstrate a picture of the EP as valuing participatory norm, extending to the way in 




The growing extent of trilogues as a legislative mechanism has resulted in 
participation from the Parliament side becoming increasingly formalized over time 
through Rules of Procedure (69) to provide for checks and balances. Negotiating 
mandates are approved either at Committee level or in Plenary of the EP, and 





negotiators report back regularly to Committees and always to the Members of 
committees who serve as political group co-ordinators, with the final agreement 
subject to approval at Committee and then Plenary. These have been accompanied by 
cross-committee norms in which Committee Chairs chair trilogue meetings as a 
means to enforce committee positions (citation 1). These arrangements therefore 
strengthen the EP’s capacity for institutional assertion linked to champion public 
interest positions.  Whilst access to information from trilogues requires diffuse 
interests to be organized, we found little evidence among the NGOs we interviewed 
that the secluded nature of trilogues present difficulties for them.  One NGO EP 
liaison officer sought to convey the sufficiency of his own antennae with the comment 
that “if you have the frequency you can tune in to it” (interview 20), while another 
remarked that ‘as soon as you have a trilogue half of Brussels knows what goes on’ 
(interview 21). NGOs generally reported the EP as their information source from 
trilogues, sometimes proposed amendments which EP negotiators used in trilogues 
(interview 22). One commented on how MEPs assistants would send him text 
messages informing him about the course of negotiations during the trilogue meeting 
itself (interview 23), while others reported returning information by this means to EP 
negotiators during Trilogue meetings (interview 24). Where necessary, EP negotiators 
use NGOs as a means to obtain a reaction (interview 25), or as a means of exerting 
leverage on the Council (interview 26), and sometimes as a route to the media. In the 
development policy field, we also found evidence of member state permanent 
representations using NGOs as a means of influencing the position of other member 
states in the Council (interview 27). Beyond political purposes, we found evidence of 
engagement with technical trilogues by NGOs through contact with political group 





staff (interview 20). These insights provide evidence of the two-way dialogue in 





In this article, we begin revisiting, in the light of contemporary evidence, an 
influential claim in the literature on EU policy making that the EP is a highly 
receptive venue for diffuse interests. This claim has recently come under pressure 
from explanations related to the shift from consultation to co-decision, and political 
factors related to the internal political opportunity structure in the EP. As this 
literature is rapidly developing, we have shown that a political opportunity structure 
framework provides a conceptual umbrella to highlight the common focus of these 
claims on structural-institutional constraints of NGO engagement, while recognizing 
their specific contribution for understanding evolving EP preferences, the institutional 
rules of the game under co-decision, and specific versus general opportunities. The 
evidence we provide nuances the literature on the EP.  It is difficult to trace the shift 
to co-decision to a systematic change in EP behaviour vis-à-vis diffuse interests. It 
seems fruitless to look for a macro-level across-the-board effect of co-decision. 
Rather, the links between the EP and NGOs are variegated and much more context- 
sensitive. As Rasmussen (2015) found, the continuing ability of the traditional 
EP/NGO nexus to prevail is dependent on a series of much more specific variables, 
such as: the extent to which business is unified on a given policy option; the level of 
committee support; the level of member state support; and the policy issue type 
(Rasmussen, 2015). These findings resonate with emphasis on the significance of 
framing, and issue saliency, in explaining variation in legislative outcomes at EU 
level (Klüver, Braun & Beyers, 2015).  They suggest that the concept of political 





opportunity structure can only be fruitful if it is operationalized at a much finer degree 
of detail. 
On the EP side, contrary to common expectations that increased legislative 
competence might reduce the EP’s receptiveness to diffuse interests, we found that 
the EP’s enduring desire for institutional assertion goes hand-in-hand with a 
commitment to pluralisation and the promotion of diffuse interests. Some highly 
salient issues in complex, and traditionally producer-dominated policy fields have 
provided an opportunity for the EP to demonstrate it is still the champion of diffuse 
interests. In particular, we have shown how the EP has developed knowledge 
capacities to act as an autonomous actor. The EP has become a formidably well- 
resourced actor, probably only second to the US Congress in terms of access to 
economic and policy knowledge. The assumed poor capacity of EP committee 
secretariats has been remedied, while the formation of the European Parliament 
Research Service in 2013 provides the means to undertake impact assessments 
through a mixture of in-house and outsourced resources. These developments post- 
date a number of earlier contributions to the debate about the supposedly poor 
information capacity of the EP to keep pace with its enhanced powers. Moreover, 
vigorous networks based around MEPs assistants, as well as policy advisors of party 
groups provide evidence of the robustness of ties between MEPs and well 
institutionalized NGOs as diffuse interest advocates. The distributional effects of 
regulatory proposals ensure contestation and a continued supply of information which 
helps to nurture the institutional autonomy of the EP. 
On the NGOs’ side, data from the Transparency Register about EP pass 
holders helps to reinforce a picture of a population of NGOs established at EU level 
which is sufficiently well resourced to be able to engage with the EP at a level of 





depth. We do not find much evidence that changes in the decision-making procedure 
have made the EP a less receptive venue for influence. We also identified how NGOs 
work with the electoral cycle of the EP to their advantage in ways which would be 
less suitable for many business related organisations, such as public campaigning 
aimed at securing pledges from MEPs. We have found that a key driver which 
differentiates the way in which NGOs work with the EP, with a core group of NGOs 
primarily (but not exclusively) centred around the issue-specific features of their 
work. While NGOs in the field of demographic politics work intensively through 
intergroups, and have a dedicated EP liaison officer, other NGOs ‘mainstream’ EP 
relations in the work of their policy officers. Issues like aging or disability, and health 
related policy fields, lend themselves particularly well to the development of cross- 
party consensus given their cross-cutting nature. Finally, when lobbying is directed 
elsewhere than the EP, this sometimes reflects a logic of ‘next best’ friend—taking 
the EP as ‘the best friend’ as a given. 
These insights nuance the literature on the EP while supporting well- grounded 
accounts of the generally beneficial effect of EP actions for some types of NGOs, as 
advocates of diffuse interests (Bernhagen, Dür & Marshall, 2015). On highly salient 
issues, both the EP and NGOs continue to take up strong public goods orientated 
positions, and where citizen mobilisation comes in advance of NGO activism there 
are stronger incentives for EP alignment. They also provide preliminary support for 
the view of the EP as demoi-cratic, legitimacy-seeking institution. In this article, we 
have outlined a “demoi-cratic” perspective on this issue. Our take is that viewing the 
EP as a legitimacy seeking institution suggests a different outlook for EP-NGO 
relations, as the EP, acting upon accepted standards of legitimacy, will seek to 
develop institutional autonomy, including internal economic and social knowledge, 





and valuing participatory norms. These are only preliminary findings. Further 
research must flesh out the demoi-cratic framework and its implications. For 
normative reasons, and given the multi-level character of the EU, we should expect 
the EP to continue to cultivate ties to NGOs and develop the knowledge capacities 
required to establish an autonomous policy space. 
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IP AGE Platform Europe 14 7 
Allergy & Asthma IG European Federation 
of Allergy & Airways 
Diseases Patients 
Associations 
No entry  
Anti-Racism and 
Diversity 




Brain, Mind & 
Pain 





Carers IG Eurocarers 4 3 




and Human Rights 
IP ATD Quart Monde 3 0 
European Patients 
Rights & Cross- 
Border Healthcare 
IG Active Citizenship 
Network 
No entry  
Innovation in 
Health & Social 
Care 




IP The European Region 
of the International 
Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association 
4.5 1 
Maternal & Neo- 
natal health 
IG European Federation 
for the Care of 
Newborn Infants 
No entry  







Well Being & 
Brain Disorder 










MEP Heart Group IG European Heart 
Network/European 
Society of Cardiology 
4/3 3/1 
Patient Access to 
Health Care 
IG Patient Access 
Partnership 





and third sector 






IP Eurogroup for 
Animals 
5 4 
Youth issues IP European Youth 
Forum 
15 7 
Sources: European Parliament intergroup webpages; Transparency Register; NGO 
websites. 





















































































% of Belgian 
organisations 








I - Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants 793 211 27% 3.6 318 40% 162 77% 51% 4.2 
Law firms 72 9 13% 1.4 25 35% 5 56% 20% 1.4 
Professional consultancies 494 153 31% 4.5 209 42% 123 80% 59% 5.2 
Self-employed consultants 227 49 22% 1.2 84 37% 34 69% 40% 1.1 
II - In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations 3272 850 26% 2.6 1409 43% 698 82% 50% 2.8 
Companies  & groups 896 305 34% 2.5 357 40% 230 75% 64% 2.8 
Other similar organisations 222 52 23% 2.8 91 41% 48 92% 53% 2.9 
Trade unions 139 27 19% 2.2 45 32% 22 81% 49% 2.5 
Trade, business & professional associations 2015 466 23% 2.6 916 45% 398 85% 43% 2.8 
III - Non-governmental organisations 1649 360 22% 2.8 590 36% 280 78% 47% 3.0 
Non-governmental organisations, platforms and networks and similar 1649 360 22% 2.8 590 36% 280 78% 47% 3.0 
IV - Think  tanks, research and academic institutions 466 61 13% 2.0 130 28% 48 79% 37% 2.1 
Academic institutions 129 10 8% 1.7 19 15% 7 70% 37% 2.0 
Think  tanks and research institutions 337 51 15% 2.1 111 33% 41 80% 37% 2.1 
V - Organisations representing churches and religious communities 39 16 41% 2.4 19 49% 14 88% 74% 2.5 
Organisations representing churches and religious communities 39 16 41% 2.4 19 49% 14 88% 74% 2.5 
VI - Organisations representing local, regional and municipal authorities 299 54 18% 3.0 133 44% 40 74% 30% 2.5 
Local, regional and municipal authorities (at sub-national level) 128 23 18% 3.6 71 55% 17 74% 24% 3.9 
Other public or mixed entities, etc. 171 31 18% 2.6 62 36% 23 74% 37% 1.5 
Grand Total 6518 1552 24% 2.8 2599 40% 1242 80% 48% 3.0 
 
 
3 We are grateful to Joanna Dreger for compilation of this table. 









Table 3: Distribution of pass-holders in 
Transparency Register Category IIIiv 
 






6 or more 37 
 
Source: Transparency Register data, own analysis, 2018 
 
 
Table 4: Top EP pass-holders: Transparency Register Category III 
 
Organisation Number of passes 
BEUC (European Consumers 
Organisation) 
22 
Global Network for Rights and 
Development 
15 
German Consumers Association 14 
Greenpeace European Unit 12 
Amnesty International European 
institutions office 
11 
European Women’s Lobby 11 
ATHENA EULOGOS 9 
Transparency International Liaison Office 
to the EU 
9 
 






i Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament. 
ii the European Commission proposal for a Directive on the Patentability of Computer 
Implemented Inventions 2002/0047 (COD) of 20 February 2002 
iii Examples include SdM 18; Rue de l’Industrie 10; Rue d’Edimbourg 26. 
iv ‘NGOs, platforms and networks and similar.’ 
